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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I want to interrogate the political, economic, and social conditions that enable the 
extraction of natural and mineral resources from Indigenous and rural communities in Africa, the 
Americas, and the Asia -Pacific.  The end of direct colonialism and the emergence of the 
development state did not necessarily translate into forms of local sovereignty for these 
communities who bore the brunt of development.  I describe the emergence of resource wars in 
the postcolonial era and how organizational technologies of extraction, exclusion and expulsion 
lead to dispossession and death.  I conclude by discussing possibilities of resistance and develop 
the notion of translocal governance where local actors most affected by development are able to 
forge a series of temporary coalitions with international and national groups in an attempt to 
promote some form of participatory democracy.  The paper advance debates on postcolonialism 
by developing theoretical insights from translocal modes of resistance that open up new 
analytical spaces marked by particular configurations of market, state and civil society actors. 
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 HISTORIES OF OPPRESSION AND VOICES OF RESISTANCE: TOWARDS A 
THEORY OF THE TRANSLOCAL 
The Berlin Wall fell.  Imperialism rode on the triumphal wave to rehabilitate itself.  
Douglas Hurd, the then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, heaved a sigh 
of relief:  ‘We are slowly putting behind us a period of history when the West was 
unable to express a legitimate interest in the developing world without being accused 
of imperialism’. 
Issa Shivji (2006: 9). 
  
 In this paper I want to interrogate the political, economic, and social conditions that 
enable the ‘rehabilitation’ of imperialism in the postcolonial era through processes of internal 
colonialism.  I examine the institutional, economic and discursive technologies of power that 
sustain internal colonialism enabling the extraction of natural resources from Indigenous and 
rural communities in Africa, the Americas, and the Asia -Pacific.  The end of direct colonialism 
and the emergence of the development state in the former colonies did not necessarily translate 
into forms of local sovereignty for these communities who bore the brunt of development.  
Despite being citizens of newly created nation states and no longer subjects of empire many 
Indigenous and rural communities found themselves engaged in conflicts over land and resources 
with their own governments or with transnational corporations.  If as the above quote suggests 
the ‘West’ can no longer be accused of imperialism now that the era of direct colonialism has 
ended (an assertion that is strongly refuted by several scholars – see for example Escobar, 1995; 
Shiva, 2001; Banerjee, 2003; 2008; Harvey, 2005; Mattei and Nader, 2008) in what ways do 
colonial forms of extraction continue to operate in the postcolonial era?  What are the political 
economies and organizational forms of internal colonialism in postcolonial states?  In what ways 
does the nexus between the state and the market maintain colonial modes of extraction?  How are 
 these practices resisted by the communities that are subjected to colonial modes of 
governmentality?  These are some of the questions I explore in the paper. 
 In theorizing accumulation processes in the postcolonial era I developed the concept of 
necrocapitalism defined as ‘specific capitalist practices of modes of organizational accumulation 
that involve dispossession, death, torture, suicide, slavery, destruction of livelihoods and the 
general organization and management of violence’ (Banerjee, 2008: 1543).  Accumulation by 
dispossession has also been described by David Harvey (2003) as the ‘New Imperialism’ that 
characterizes the contemporary neoliberal political economy, which bears a striking resemblance 
to Marx’s description of primitive accumulation that preceded industrial capitalism.  The state 
played a crucial role both in the development of primitive accumulation and its transformation to 
industrial capitalism.  From the days of the British Empire when the East India Company 
conquered territories, pillaged lands, enslaved populations and set up colonial outposts to serve 
king and country to the emergence of the modern sovereign nation state and its organizational 
accumulator, the transnational corporation, military strength was always an enabling factor of the 
accumulation process.  In the postcolonial era, the nation state as the only legitimate purveyor of 
violence continues to play a key role in the accumulation process.  However, the lines between 
state authority and market authority are not clearly defined: powerful market actors like 
transnational corporations often have their own ‘police’ or use private militias to ‘protect’ their 
assets in the Third World.   Deployment of private military forces was a key strategy of the 
United States government during both invasions of Iraq and in occupied Iraq private military 
contractors outnumbered military forces of all allied forces with the exception of the United 
States (Singer, 2004). 
  Internal colonialism replicates older patterns of imperialism as can be seen in the 
dominance of neoliberal policies in today’s global political economy.  Transnational corporations 
often wield power over Third World countries through their enticements of foreign investment 
and their threats to withhold or relocate their investments. In return for foreign investments and 
jobs corporations are able to extract from impoverished and often corrupt Third World 
governments tax concessions, energy and water subsidies, minimal environmental legislation, 
minerals and natural resources, a compliant labor force and the creation of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ) which are essentially states of exception where the law is suspended for the 
business of economic extraction to continue.  Thus, rather than mark the death of the nation state 
as some globalization theorists claim, the global economy is predicated on a system of nation 
states that serve as circuits for globalization in the operations of transnational corporations, the 
maintenance of a global financial system, development of policies that determine the mobility of 
labor, and in the creation of the multi-state institutions such as the United Nations, International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank, North American Free Trade Agreement and World Trade 
Organization (Banerjee et al., 2009; Harvey, 2005).  In the next sections I discuss how extractive 
processes of accumulation are organized and managed by state and market actors resulting in 
conditions that can best be described as internal colonialism within the postcolonial and how 
local communities engage with national and transnational actors in organizing resistance against 
extractive practices. 
 
The Organization and Management of Internal Colonialism  
 In order to better understand the context of necrocapitalist modes of accumulation that 
result in dispossession, loss of livelihood and death I want to focus on the intersection of market 
 and state interests that create particular extractive regimes leading to violent conflicts between 
Indigenous communities, transnational corporations and governments – conflicts that are 
occurring in the former colonies in Asia, the Americas, Africa and the Pacific.  These 
postcolonial spaces also contain sites where certain populations live and die under conditions of 
internal colonialism marked by a political economy of resource extraction that is based on 
colonial forms of development. 
 The first ever United Nations report on the State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 
released in January 2010 paints a despairing picture of poverty, deprivation, poor health, loss of 
livelihoods, environmental destruction, social dislocation, cultural marginalization, human rights 
abuses, dispossession, and violence (United Nations, 2009).  The report concluded that 
‘Indigenous peoples bear disproportionate costs from resource-intensive and resource-extractive 
industries’ (United Nations, 2009: 17).  These ‘disproportionate costs’ include disease, death, 
forceful expulsion, environmental destruction, misappropriation of Indigenous knowledge, and 
loss of livelihood but ironically show up in corporate balance sheets and government budget 
figures as profits and revenues.  It is also important to note that conflicts and dispossession are 
all occurring in democratic countries, not military dictatorships, which begs the question: in what 
way is democracy serving these communities?  And if the state and market produce 
disempowering outcomes (or ‘disproportionate costs’ to quote the UN report) for Indigenous and 
rural communities in democratic societies how can these communities resist such practices?  
Before we explore these questions let us examine some recent conflicts where the globalization 
of transnational capital in the form of multinational corporations and national governments 
organizes the ‘legitimate’ violence of the state to forcibly relocate, maim or kill Indigenous and 
rural communities in order to extract surplus from their land.  In many ways the replacement of 
 imperialism by internal colonialism makes the process of extraction more ‘efficient’ in the sense 
that former colonies no longer need to be governed.  Imperial governance has been replaced by 
internal colonial management where imperialism has learned to manage things better by using 
the elites of the former colonies to do the governing, the structural power of supranational 
institutions like the World Trade Organization, World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
and markets to do much of the imperial work.  Internal colonialism is characterized by three 
modes of management that enable accumulation by dispossession: management by extraction, 
management by exclusion and management by expulsion.      
 Management by extraction arises from the ‘endowment curse’ and is an all too familiar 
discourse for millions of people in the Third World living and dying because of the oil curse and 
the minerals curse.  Extraction of oil and minerals in many parts of the world is almost always 
accompanied by violence, environmental destruction, dispossession and death (Banerjee, 2008).  
Transnational oil companies, governments, private security forces are all key actors in these 
zones of violence and the communities most affected by this violence are forced to give up their 
sovereignty, autonomy, and tradition in exchange for modernity and economic development 
which continue to elude them.  Shell in Nigeria, Chevron in Ecuador, Rio Tinto in Papua, 
Barrick in Peru and Argentina, Newmont Mining in Peru, Vedanta Resources in India and the 
Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico are but a few of the more well publicized cases of the 
endowment curse.  The market, state and international economic and financial institutions are 
inextricably involved in management by extraction.  The Chiapas region of Mexico for example, 
produces 54% of Mexico’s hydroelectric energy, 21% of its oil, and 47% of its natural gas also 
contains the country’s most impoverished people where 36% of the population do not have 
running water and 35% do not have electricity.  There are 7 hotel beds for every 1000 tourists 
 and 0.3 hospital beds for every 1000 locals.  In one of the country’s richest regions in terms of 
natural resources and a source of wealth for the rest of the country, 71.6% of the indigenous 
population in the region suffers from malnutrition and 14,500 people die every year from 
treatable diseases (Banerjee, 2008). Transnational corporations extract wealth from Chiapas by 
mining their land, felling their forests, and selling a tourist experience at the expense of local 
communities who have the misfortune of ‘inhabiting’ the region.  In 1994 thousands of 
Chiapians rose up against the Mexican government in an armed insurrection and temporarily 
took over the regional capital of San Cristobal.  The Mexican government responded with 
military action and after a series of violent conflicts offered a ‘conditional pardon’ to the rebels.  
The market was not particularly sympathetic to the plight of the Zapatistas either.   In a memo 
titled ‘Mexico – Political Update’ , the Chase Manhattan Bank, a major financer of the Mexican 
government concluded that the ‘government will need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate 
their effective control of the national territory and security policy’.  Thus, international finance 
and infrastructure is a key requirement for ‘development’ to occur in ‘underdeveloped’ areas, of 
which governments must demonstrate ‘effective control and security’, which means certain 
communities need to be ‘eliminated’.  
 Management by exclusion arises from the ‘democracy curse’ and is another practice that 
is commonly used to govern the political economy.  During the negotiations leading up to the 
Kyoto protocol one of the tasks allocated to a policy group was to develop a global forest policy 
to offset greenhouse gas emissions.  Conscious of the fallout from the protests that accompanied 
the 1999 World Trade Organization meetings at Seattle and similar protests at the World 
Economic Forum at Davos, Genoa and Melbourne, the organizers were careful to be seen to be 
inclusive and invited green groups, unions, community organizations, apart from corporations, 
 policy makers and scientists.  However, in their quest to come up with a global forest policy they 
omitted to invite a key stakeholder group: representatives of millions of people who actually live 
in the forest, mainly Indigenous tribes.  The forest dwelling tribes held their own climate change 
summit and proclaimed their own resolution at the International Indigenous Forum on Climate 
Change: 
‘The measures to mitigate climate change currently being negotiated are based on a 
worldview of territory that reduces forests, lands, seas and sacred sites to only their 
carbon absorption capacity.  This world-view and its practices adversely affect the 
lives of Indigenous Peoples and violate our fundamental rights and liberties, 
particularly, our right to recuperate, maintain, control and administer our territories 
which are consecrated and established in instruments of the United Nations’ (IIFC, 
2000). 
 
 For indigenous people who inhabit the region, forests are not just carbon sinks - forests 
are their food, livelihood, source of medicine, housing, culture, society, polity and economy.  
Global trade and environmental policies are often made without taking into account the violence 
and dispossession of Indigenous communities that result from these policies. It becomes 
meaningless to debate issues of forest rights when there are no forests left.  Dispossession of 
local communities also highlights both the failure of the market and state where ‘citizens’ of 
democratic states do not have the right to determine their future.   
 Management by expulsion arises from the ‘development curse’ involving forced 
expulsion of Indigenous populations to make way for infrastructure and energy projects.  In India 
it is estimated that 30 to 50 million people have lost their traditional lands as a result of dam 
projects since 1947.   A single megadam project, the Sardar Sarovar dam project will displace 
400,000 tribal peoples once it is completed.  The expelled and the dispossessed as is the case in 
many former colonies do not participate in any of the benefits: the electricity generated by the 
dams is for use by city dwellers and the water for irrigating large industrial agriculture farms. 
 Both state and market actors collude in displacement of local populations.  A recent report by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations investigated ‘large scale land 
acquisitions of farmland’ in several African countries mainly by foreign agribusiness 
corporations, often in collaborative projects with domestic governments (Cotula et al., 2009).  
Similar ‘land grabs’ occurring in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Central Asia have been 
reported in the media.  Concerns about food security and increasing demand for biofuels are 
driving forces behind these land acquisitions leading to displacement of local populations.  And 
despite the requirement for consultation with communities affected by land acquisition, the 
report cites a ‘lack of transparency’, inadequate levels of consultation, and absence of legal 
mechanisms to protect local rights, interests, livelihoods and welfare.  Accumulation by 
dispossession is referred to in more polite terms in the report: ‘the reality on the ground result in 
major costs being internalized by local people (Cotula et al., 2009: 101).  As in the United 
Nations report on Indigenous peoples, the institutional logics and language of necrocapitalism 
are apparent: displacement, dispossession and death are framed as ‘disproportionate costs’ that 
have to be ‘internalized by local people’. 
 It is not just Indigenous communities that are affected by the ‘development’ curse of 
which resource extraction is just one component.  India’s rural economy, which supports nearly 
70% of its population, is being ‘garroted’ according to Roy (2001) as a result of agricultural 
reforms and a scramble for cash crop production.  Small farmers who make up a majority of 
agricultural producers find themselves unable to escape the debt trap and have to give up their 
land and move to regional cities in search of casual employment.  In many cases the expulsion is 
permanent: they commit suicide.  Agricultural ‘reforms’ and trade liberalization (agriculture is 
‘liberalized’ in the Third World and protected in the First World) has been directly linked to a 
 260% increase in the suicide rates of farmers in India.  More than 4000 farmers committed 
suicide in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh since the imposition of agricultural reforms.  In 
2005 there were 520 suicides by farmers in Vidharbha, the largest cotton-growing region in 
India.  There were more suicides in cash crop growing regions than in food growing regions.  
According to P. Sainath, the Rural Affairs Editor of The Hindu, a leading newspaper in India, 6 
journalists covered the ‘farmer suicides’ stories in February 2006.   That same week 512 
journalists were jostling for space at Mumbai’s premier fashion event, Lakme Fashion Week, 
where models were exhibiting the new chic cotton dresses made from cotton grown by farmers 
who were killing themselves less than 500 kilometers away.  Alarmed by the increase in suicides 
among poor farmers the Indian government sent teams of psychiatrists to the region to counsel 
farmers and their families and advise them on ‘managing stress’.   Sainath (2006) writes about a 
young farmer whose father committed suicide after facing mounting debts who had this to say to 
the visiting psychiatrists:  
‘You came here and asked us many questions and gave us many answers. Don’t 
drink you said.  Don’t beat your wife.  Do yoga to handle stress.  You never asked 
this one question: Why are farmers of this country who place food on the nation’s 
table starving?’ 
  
 Some critics might dismiss the above examples for being ‘anecdotal’ evidence lacking in 
empirical rigor.  While there may be some credence to this charge I would argue that 4000 dead 
and thousands more dispossessed due to ‘market forces’, ‘development’, ‘modernity’ should 
have some empirical validity.  Structural adjustment policies of global institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank and large-scale privatization of the provision of 
public goods in the Third World are directly responsible for much of this dispossession and 
extraction leading to the poor becoming even more marginalized (Banerjee, 2008; Harvey, 
 2005).  Joseph Stiglitz, former Vice President of the World Bank, once the blue eyed boy of the 
neoliberal establishment and now a traitor to their cause provided a succinct analysis of the 
World Bank’s economic development policies when he stated ‘we did manage to tighten the 
belts of the poor as we loosened those on the rich’ (Stiglitz, 2003: 49).   
 We have seen how the management of imperialism and colonialism in the postcolonial 
era through organizational practices of extraction, exclusion and expulsion result in death and 
dispossession of populations. What do they tell us of the condition of internal colonialism in 
‘postcolonial’ states where these practices are prevalent?  Why do these practices that appear to 
mirror colonial practices occur in sovereign nation states free of colonial rule and now governed 
by their ‘own people’?  To explore these questions we need to travel through complex terrains of 
postcolonial and Indigenous sovereignties, ethnic nationalisms, self-determination, territoriality 
and political authority. 
 
‘Post’colonial Sovereignties and Indigenous Rights     
 Relationships and conflicts between nation states have long been the purview of the 
discipline of international relations.  In an era of globalization marked by the increasing 
penetration of global capital into the public sphere and the corresponding shift in state policies as 
enablers of capital expansion as well as the rise of more private forms of authority and 
governance (for example, voluntary environmental standards, privatized military forces, trade 
and industry associations, nongovernmental organizations) state-centric models of international 
relations are unable to capture the complexities and power dynamics of relationships between the 
market, state and civil society.   Moreover, state centric models of international relations are too 
focused on structures and provide little space for agency for local communities to articulate 
 modes of resistance to exploitative extractive practices.  Regional and local modes of 
governance, the rise of local resistance and separatist movements across the world reflect both a 
form of internal sovereignty and internal colonialism that state centric modes of analysis cannot 
explain (Bleiker, 2000; Pauly and Grande, 2005).   
 Independence from colonial rule did not mean that all populations enjoyed the benefits of 
sovereignty.  Indigenous sovereignty was never fully realized in postcolonial states where direct 
colonialism was replaced by elite nationalism, as was the case in several countries in Asia, 
Africa and South America.  In India for example many tribal populations found themselves 
increasingly in conflict with the development state because large scale infrastructure projects 
necessary for the nation’s ‘development’ invariably led to resource extraction, loss of 
livelihoods, dispossession and death for sections of the rural poor (Cederlöf and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2005).   The transition from colonialism to nationalism while marking a 
postcolonial moment for the nation state excluded large segments of its populations who were 
now governed by the same rationality that inscribed the colonial project.  The path to modernity 
and development continued the trajectory of colonialism and as we shall see later, undermined 
the very principles of democracy that are supposed to govern modern nation states.      
 In an attempt to assert sovereignty on their lands many tribal communities deployed their 
tribal identities and cultural, economic and social affinities to nature and the land resulting in the 
emergence of what Cederlöf, and Sivaramakrishnan (2005) call ‘ecological nationalisms’.  These 
ecologies were rooted in place, intensely local and regional while being profoundly different 
from discourses of modern environmentalism that emerged in the development context which 
had more to do with economic externalities of development rather than attachments to place or 
cultural relationships with nature.  Here ethnicities were inextricably intertwined with ecological 
 nationalisms that seemed paradoxical to the collective identity and citizenship that defined the 
modern nation state.   
 However, the emergence of ethnic and ecological nationalisms did not translate to direct 
political authority, which remained very much under the control of the development state.  
Nonetheless these multiple spaces may enable the emergence of multiple sovereignties and 
ultimately provide the space for ecological and livelihood rights for Indigenous populations as 
we shall see in a later section.  The preoccupation with the postcolonial state as the key agent of 
development and nationalism also meant acceptance of colonial institutional norms of property 
rights regimes and resource use, notions that were often incommensurable with Indigenous 
notions of property and resource rights.  The increased power and penetration of global capital 
during the postcolonial era further eroded Indigenous communities’ access to and use of 
resources.  Uneven development was accompanied by unequal citizenship by defining the rules 
of participating in the global political economy, rules that were informed by the colonial project 
and which continued to marginalize Indigenous populations.  This form of elite nationalism has 
been critiqued by several postcolonial scholars, notably those belonging to the Subaltern Studies 
group who argued that native elites appropriated the diversity of subaltern struggles against 
colonial rule in their construction of a unitary nationalist and anti-colonial movement.  
Nationalist thought however avowedly anti-colonial could not escape the categories of colonial 
regimes and became a ‘derivative discourse’ by universalizing the nation state as the most 
desirable form of political community (Chatterjee, 1992: 19). 
 In much of the mainstream literature in international relations and political science 
sovereignty is represented as a fixed and stable category that defines the territoriality and 
political authority of nation states.   However, sovereignties were routinely transgressed during 
 the colonial era where the colony became constructed as a permanent state of exception as far as 
sovereignty of non-European regions was concerned.  Far from being unitary and indivisible 
sovereignty remains divisible and uneven in the postcolonial era where differential rights are 
produced and maintained by economic and political arrangements creating what Stoler (2006: 
128) calls ‘imperial formations’.  Native business and government elites, more often than not 
Western educated, deploying local police and militaries organize the relocation of populations, 
extraction of resources and reterritorialization so that accumulation and extraction can proceed 
without disruption (Hoogvelt, 2001; Stoler, 2006).  Military action is justified in the name of 
‘security’ and in recent times violent protests by tribal communities are increasingly being 
portrayed as ‘acts of terror’ by governments and industry groups.  In India for example there are 
ongoing conflicts between tribal communities in Lalgarh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa to 
name just a few regions.  Both government and industry leaders refer to tribal protestors as 
‘terrorists’ and are able to deploy the military and local police using draconian anti-terrorist laws 
to arrest and even kill protestors.  Several arrested tribal leaders have attested that in many cases 
the police followed orders directly from mining company officials, which reflects a system of 
private authority that is becoming increasingly prevalent in the governance of Indigenous 
communities (Roy, 2009).    
 Nationalism and the emergence of the developmental state in the postcolonial state 
created particular divisions of sovereignty and citizenship rights as well as subjectivities and new 
governance arrangements based on market principles.  Ong (2006) refers to these developments 
as ‘graduated sovereignty’ to describe the neoliberal turn in Southeast Asia where the interplay 
of market and state results in differing levels of sovereignty: some areas of the economy have a 
very strong state presence and in other areas, markets and foreign capital rule.  State repression 
 against rebel populations and separatist movements is often influenced by market forces:  as Ong 
(2006) argues territories are cleared of rebels (‘outlawed citizens’) to make way for logging 
concessions, petroleum pipelines, mines and dams.  Democratic rights of sovereign citizens can 
be exercised only in the political sphere during election time while less sovereign citizens like 
Indigenous populations are stripped of their economic rights, livelihood rights and resource 
rights in the name of development.     
   Osuri (2009) provides a sophisticated analysis of paradoxical divisions in sovereignty in 
‘postcolonial’ Australia where Indigenous sovereignty still remains unresolved.   A racialized 
sovereignty operates in Australia where traditional notions of unitary and indivisible sovereignty 
operate as a form of White sovereignty that reflects Australia’s continuing colonial legacy for its 
Indigenous inhabitants (Moreton-Robinson, 2007; Osuri, 2009).  Unequal sovereignty in 
Indigenous Australia was once again brought into stark reality in 2007 when the Federal 
government enacted its ‘Intervention’ policy on Aboriginal communities in the Northern 
Territory in the name of addressing sexual abuse and domestic violence against women and 
children.  The ‘Intervention’ (or “Interference’ as some local Aboriginal leaders called it) 
involved the quarantining of welfare payments, which was made legally possible by suspending 
the Racial Discrimination Act.   Almost identical measures were used to control and govern 
Indigenous populations during colonial times.  This division of sovereignty in a modern 
democratic nation was possible paradoxically enough, by deploying an indivisible, absolute and 
unconditional notion of sovereign power, calling into question concepts of both democracy and 
sovereignty.  In the Australian context Indigenous sovereignty was never actually legally ceded 
and several Indigenous scholars are attempting to use this space to define postcolonial notions of 
Indigenous sovereignty that are not informed by colonial frameworks of governance, authority, 
 territoriality and individual rights (Moreton-Robinson, 2007).  The governance of Indigenous 
communities in Australia involves divided sovereignties – an internal, local, communal 
sovereignty that reflects Indigenous identity through their cultural norms and prior ‘ownership’ 
of their land and a civic sovereignty that interpellates them as citizens into a European 
framework of a modern, democratic state whose sovereign rights were used to illegally occupy 
Indigenous lands and colonize peoples in the first place (Brady, 2007).  For Indigenous 
communities in postcolonial Australia sovereignty exists while also actively being rejected 
illustrating that ‘colonization is a living process’ (Moreton-Robinson, 2007: 2). 
 Our discussion up to this point has focused on the political and economic conditions that 
create and sustain colonial modes of development in the postcolonial era.  The organizational 
forms that enable extraction operate at international, national, regional and local levels and 
include structural adjustment and privatization policies of the World Bank, the global authority 
of the World Trade Organization in regulating international trade, bilateral and multilateral ‘free 
trade’ agreements like NAFTA, ‘Special Economic Zones’, multinational corporations, 
government owned corporations, joint ventures, industry associations, and even some so called 
non-governmental organizations that are basically lobbyists for corporate interests.  These 
institutional and organizational forms ensure that colonization continues to be a ‘living process’ 
for Indigenous and rural communities, which then begs the question: where is the space for 
resistance?  If uneven development leads to unequal and divided sovereignties where then is the 
agency of marginalized groups who live and die under accumulation and extractive regimes?  In 
the next section I will explore some avenues of resistance and develop some preliminary ideas 
for a theory of translocal resistance.     
 
 Translocal Resistance and Translocal Governance 
They built dams, drowned villages and built factories 
They cut down forests, dug out mines and built sanctuaries 
Without water, land and forest where do we go? 
Oh God of Development, pray tell us how to save our lives? 
 
The minister has become industry’s broker 
Snatched away our lands 
Armed platoons protect them 
The government officer is king and the contractor is a millionaire 
Our village has become their colony 
 
     Song by Bhagwan Majhi, leader of the Indigenous struggle 
against bauxite mining in Kashipur, India (Visual Search, 2008). 
  
 So how have communities resisted these long and violent histories of oppression?  
Indigenous communities in Australia, Africa, the Americas and the Asia Pacific have been 
fighting transnational corporations and their own governments over access to resources for 
decades and the conflicts are becoming increasingly violent.  For communities engaged in 
livelihood struggles the struggle is almost always a ‘fight to the death’ – thousands of people 
have paid with their lives to protect their lands and livelihoods (Banerjee, 2008).  These 
resistance movements cannot be described as international, transnational or global but are more 
translocal in nature: local communities living (and dying) in so-called democratic societies but 
governed in very non-democratic ways that are engaged in conflicts with both the state and the 
market, and sometimes even with ‘civil society’ while also making connections with other 
resistance movements in different parts of the world.  Table 1 gives a snapshot of some ongoing 
conflicts between Indigenous communities and extractive industries supported by postcolonial 
states.  This is by no means a comprehensive list and was created by a very basic internet and 
library search using keywords like ‘mining conflicts’, ‘Indigenous protests’, ‘land rights’, ‘and 
environmental conflicts’.   
 ------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 around here 
-------------------------------------- 
 There are striking similarities in the countries and regions where these conflicts are 
taking place:  all of them are in former colonies now officially decolonized.  National and state 
governments in every case are involved in the project in some way: either as joint venture 
partners or as providers of ‘security’ for transnational corporations.  A variety of local, regional 
and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) constitute civil society actors who 
represent or claim to represent community interests in different ways.  It is important to note here 
that while NGOs can play a crucial political role in mediating conflicts and representing 
community interests they do not automatically hold the moral high ground when it comes to 
social and environmental issues or representing Indigenous communities.  NGOs and civil 
society actors may not be profit driven, but their power and legitimacy to represent marginalized 
groups must also be scrutinized along with their motives and intentions.  All NGOs do not 
necessarily represent interests of marginalized communities and neither are all outcomes of NGO 
strategies beneficial to the communities they represent (Shivji, 2006).  Civil society actors 
sometimes can merely serve as instruments of state policy.  They can also manipulate states and 
market actors to further their own agendas (Escobar, 1995). 
 So what does ‘translocal resistance’ mean?  Translocality refers to the multiplicity of 
local spaces and actors and their interrelationships in a global world.  Whereas transnationalism 
continues to privilege nation states as the primary unit of analysis there are specific local spaces 
that are distributed across multiple nation states involving particular configurations of actors, 
resources, territory, authority, rights and relationships of power (Sassen, 2006).  These 
 assemblages do not fall into neat categories such as the national or the global.  Translocal spaces 
can create new spaces of agency and overcome the constraints posed by a nation-state bounded 
view of international relations.  These spaces are translocal because they both transgress and 
transcend locality and have the ability to change the local spaces from which they emerge.  
Translocality thus marks a shift from nation state based formations of identity and its 
relationships with territory and political authority (Appadurai. 1996).  Empirical accounts of 
translocality in the literature include ethnographic analysis of labor migration and the 
experiences of diasporic communities whose identities travel across nation states and are 
reconstituted in localities that transcend national territorial boundaries making these spaces 
translocal rather than transnational.  The local in translocal is not a fixed space but is theorized as 
a mode, describing not the characteristics of populations or cultures or places but focusing 
instead on the movement of people, ideas, cultures and concomitant shifts in political identity 
(Mandaville, 1999).    
 Particular configurations of territory, authority, governance arrangements, institutions, 
ethnicities and rights describe translocal spaces.  I highlight four features that characterize 
translocalities: first, they consist of horizontal and lateral networks as opposed to vertical 
networks that are a feature of nation-state governance or supranational organizations like the 
WTO or IMF (Sassen, 2006).  Second, these spaces are characterized by multivalent and 
multilevel forms of governance and authority.  Interactions between actors inhabiting translocal 
spaces occur at local, regional, national and international spaces.  Third, there is a prevalence of 
private actors that operate in translocal spaces in the form of corporations, industry associations, 
NGOs and community organizations.  As the production of public goods is increasingly taken 
over by private actors, new forms of authority and governance emerge and local communities 
 and their organizations find themselves having to negotiate directly with market actors over 
resource access (Pauly and Grande, 2005).    
 Finally, postcolonial translocal spaces are characterized by ‘juxtaposed temporalities’ 
(Sassen, 2006: 390) where the temporality of the nation state, constructed as ‘empty homogenous 
time’ sits side-by-side with alternate temporalities of Indigenous communities that inhabit the 
same space.  Differing temporalities are produced by the differential rate of acceleration of 
economic activities in different spaces within the territoriality of the nation state (Sassen, 2006).  
Time in the disembodied chronotope of the nation neutralizes other temporalities and spatialities 
thus disavowing the kind of simultaneity that makes visible the violence of colonial interrelations 
or the hierarchical management of differential identities with a given nation (Banerjee and Osuri, 
2000; Fabian 1983).  In this process alternative forms of existence, of knowledge, are either 
disallowed or subsumed into current forms of nationalism and modernity. 
 An examination of ongoing conflicts, some of which are listed in Table 1 reveals some of 
the features of postcolonial translocal spaces discussed above.  The Zapatista movement in the 
Chiapas region of Mexico for instance was characterized by multiple horizontal networks and 
was both a local movement based in the Chiapas mountains as well as a transnational civil 
society movement that used electronic communication strategically to mobilize support from 
across the globe (Sassen, 20006).  In India, activism by farmers in West Bengal protesting 
against the government take over of their land for the construction of an automobile plant, often 
directly targeting the corporation involved, resulted in the project being abandoned (Ramesh, 
2008).  A plan by the West Bengal government to create a ‘Chemicals Hub’ in a ‘Special 
Economic Zone’ in Nandigram was dropped after strong protests by local communities 
culminating in police action that killed 11 people (Kazi, 2007).  Attempts by the nation state to 
 ‘develop’ a ‘backward’ region were resisted by local communities who began to claim political 
autonomy over their lands.  According to a recent survey 15 projects in India representing an 
investment of £31 billion have been halted by massive protests and resistance movements (Kazi, 
2007).  Whether these protests resulted in ‘good’ or ‘bad’ outcomes depends on the context in 
which the question is posed and also reflects the multivalence of translocal spaces.  For 
governments and corporations these resistance movements represent a loss of revenue and profits 
whereas for Indigenous communities ‘development’ means loss of land and livelihoods and often 
life itself.  Rather than focus on whether the protest actions were right or wrong or whether the 
outcomes were good and bad, in postcolonial translocal resistance the crucial question is who 
gets to decide what is right or wrong and how do current policy making mechanisms in society 
allow local participation in developmental decision-making?  
 Traveling now to translocal spaces in Latin America we find similar patterns of 
interaction between market, state and civil society actors (Farmer, 2005).  Indigenous 
communities in the Cofan region of the Ecuadorian Amazon joined forces with transnational 
civil society actors to protest the environmental destruction of their lands.  Their alliance with 
civil society actors enabled them to voice their concerns and demand a place in the Annual 
General Meeting of Chevron.  The oil company Texaco, currently owned by Chevron is accused 
of intentionally dumping more than 19 billion gallons of toxic waste and 16.8 gallons of crude 
oil spills in the Amazon basin during the period 1972-1992 (Romeroi and Kraus, 2009).  The 
company is facing a $27 billion damage claim filed by the natives.  Their neighbors in the 
Peruvian Amazon were not as lucky.  Indigenous protests at the proposed opening up of the 
Amazon rainforest to logging, mining and drilling were met with state violence resulting in the 
killing of more than 50 civilians by Peruvian security forces (Vidal, 2009).   
  In the context of Indigenous struggles against market and state forces translocalism has 
less to do with the mobility of populations than with the mobilization of resources, ideas, 
engagement strategies and networks across different locations.  Natural resource conflicts 
described earlier have resulted in the creation of new political identities among diverse 
populations.  These ‘ecological nationalisms’ are increasingly disembedded from territoriality 
based nation state political identities.  The political space of Indigenous postcoloniality cannot be 
recognized within the postcolonial nation state framework.  The translocality of resistance 
movements can create a new political space that while not directly challenging the authority and 
sovereignty of nation states may allow a plurality of local voices who have some say in decision-
making.  This inclusiveness is a function of both local resistance as well as movements of ideas 
and practices from transnational networks.  The types of strategies Indigenous communities 
employ to resist extractive industries, the kinds of alliances they form, the degree of direct 
engagement with government or corporate agents, their relationship with broader civil society 
actors may be situated in a particular geopolitical context but are also part of global 
communication flows that influence local practices in the international arena.  Communication 
flows across national borders also include flows of human rights and livelihood rights discourses 
that can strengthen voices of resistance of communities repressed by state and market violence 
(Appadurai, 1996).  Translocal spaces may enable resource poor civil society actors to access 
global networks and strategies.  The potential of translocal spaces to create political identities 
outside the normative boundaries of the territorial nation state may also change the institutional 
normativity of economic decision-making.  
 Civil society actors and institutions have developed extensive transnational links between 
human rights activists, labor activists, community development organizations, environmentalists 
 and Indigenous activists and have succeeded to some extent in intervening in international policy 
debates on trade, poverty and environmental issues.  Transnational civil society aims to promote 
a more democratic dialogue between state and market interests by asserting their legitimacy and 
presence at international forums such as the World Trade Organization and World Economic 
Forum meetings.  The focus of such activism is on global environmental and social concerns that 
transcend national boundaries: environmental destruction, climate change, sustainable 
development, poverty, child labor, slave labor, women’s rights, gay rights, equity, and the like.  
This vocabulary of transnational civil society circulates around sites and networks not ethnicities 
and territories (Appadurai, 1996).  However, the local struggles of Indigenous communities, as 
we have seen earlier is very much about ethnicities and territories.  The ability of local 
communities to access transnational civil society networks may give their voices more strength 
and wider coverage.  Thus, the political space of a postcolonial translocality may provide the 
agency for local communities to exert their rights. 
 Participatory democracy, whereby communities actively participate in making decisions 
about development projects rather than allow representatives in parliaments to do so, and 
accountability are central to developing a politics of the translocal.  Ultimately any reconciliation 
between economic, environmental and social interests is a political task because it involves 
structures and processes of power.  The main question for a translocal democratic politics is how 
to create forms of power that are more compatible with the principles of economic democracy at 
the local level, not the hegemonic conception of liberal democracy (Santos and Avritzer, 2005).  
In the contemporary political economy there are millions of people who experience ‘democracy 
without choices’ where as citizens of sovereign states they can vote to change ruling political 
parties but have little or no say in influencing economic policies that diminish or destroy their 
 capabilities and rights (Krastev, 2002).  The ongoing conflicts between Indigenous communities 
and the state represent a failure of hegemonic democracy.  Local struggles and resistance 
movements are ultimately struggles for the ‘democratization of democracy’, which requires 
seeking new ways of participatory decision-making as well as counter-hegemonic discursive 
practices of participatory democracy that enable both the articulation of local struggles at the 
transnational level as well as the mobilization of transnational resources for local communities  
(Santos and Avritzer, 2005: lxiii).  Thus, the governance of translocality has less to do with how 
corporations can penetrate civil society or enter into dialogue with civil society actors but more 
to do with how marginalized and impoverished communities who are non-corporate, non-state 
and often non-market actors can ensure their rights are protected in a democracy.  
 Partha Chatterjee argues that the notion of civil society itself is predominantly a western, 
middle class sanitized concept.  While civil society institutions played a key role in many anti-
colonial struggles of the 1940s, 50s and 60s, they were predominantly deployed by nationalist 
elites and reflected normative criteria of Western colonial modernity (Chatterjee, 2001).  In the 
postcolonial era under conditions of internal colonialism, the concept of civil society does not 
capture many practices of resistance and political mobilization by groups of people that are 
engaged in struggle against state and market institutions.  If Western modernity was the primary 
framework of development in the colonial era, then in the postcolonial era the key question that 
frames development is democracy and the significant sites of struggles are political societies not 
civil societies.  Chatterjee (2006) argues that democracy today is not about government by, of 
and for the people but rather better understood as a politics of the governed.  Civil society 
excludes in many parts of the world a political society consisting of populations who are not 
‘proper’ members of civil society or ‘true’ citizens in a democratic nation state - illegal migrants, 
 undocumented aliens, illegal squatters, illegal users of water, electricity, and transport.  To these 
populations I would add Indigenous communities in different parts of the world whose lands 
have essentially become war zones: imperial and colonial spaces of exception where the 
accumulation of surplus value can take place through death and dispossession.  And in the very 
near future we will see the political society expand even more as an estimated 20 to 40 million 
people become climate change refugees, a new category of political society that has to be 
‘governed’.  Civil society in many Third World countries may not represent the political society.  
In these contexts postcolonial translocality emerges at the intersection of political society and 
civil society reflecting the conflicts between modernity and democracy where segments of 
populations comprising the political society in different parts of the globe are fighting battles 
over resources against market and state actors. 
 If state and market actors are to be held accountable over resource conflicts communities 
need to establish rights over resources – in the case of Indigenous communities these are not 
individual property rights but communal rights.  The ultimate challenge of a theory of translocal 
resistance is to conceive the inconceivable: an extension of the democratic that transcends 
nation-state sovereignty, perhaps even transcends citizenship.  Translocal subaltern resistance 
requires some form of translocal sovereignty, a concept that is yet to be developed fully both 
theoretically and politically.  At least there is now some level of institutional recognition of the 
dispossession of Indigenous communities all over the world.  Acknowledging the histories of 
colonialism and dispossession suffered by Indigenous communities all over the world, the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People in 2007 (United Nations, 2010).  The Declaration was vigorously opposed by Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States, all of which were responsible for the genocide of 
 Indigenous people (Australia finally signed the Declaration in 2009).  Forty five of the 46 articles 
in the UN Declaration appear to give Indigenous peoples the right to self-determination in terms 
of ‘development or use of their lands or territories and other resources’, while requiring States to 
obtain ‘their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands 
or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources’ and providing appropriate measures to 
‘mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact’.  However, the 
final article in the Declaration makes a mockery of these noble visions for Indigenous rights 
when asserting ‘nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying or authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States’ (United Nations, 2010). 
 It is difficult to see how Indigenous communities’ rights to self-determination and 
development can be secured unless we unpack notions of state sovereignty.  Translocal political 
regimes consist of state, market and civil society actors with multilevel power and multilayered 
citizenship.  Political societies can leverage legitimacy and authority of transnational civil 
society to protect their rights when there is state or market failure.  Recent resistance movements 
are attempting to do just that with differing degrees of success.  There is currently a major 
conflict underway in the state of Orissa in India where the might of the state and the market in 
the form of a multinational mining corporation Vedanta Resources, is pitted against the Dongria 
Kondh tribal communities that inhabit the Niyamgiri hills in the region.  The corporation which 
is constructing a bauxite mine is facing spirited resistance from the Indigenous communities who 
have complained about pollution from the mine that is preventing farmers from farming their 
field, destroying their crops, killing their cattle and spreading new diseases.  The conflict, as is 
 the case with nearly all resource conflicts, took a bloody turn as the state deployed its 
‘legitimate’ violence in the name of the market using armed police forces.  ‘Informed consent’ 
and ‘rights to development’ vanish under the weight of state sovereignty and corporate power 
and highlights the fundamental incommensurability between Indigenous and state/market 
interests.   Anil Agarwal, Chairman of Vedanta Resources had this to say about his company’s 
corporate strategy: 
‘We believe our strategy and business objectives will harness India's high-quality 
wealth of mineral resources at low costs of development, positioning it as a leader on 
the global metals and mining map’ (Agarwal, 2009).  
 
 Jitu Jakaka, a tribal elder fighting the mining corporation described their struggle: 
‘We are not going to allow Vedanta at any cost.  Even if you cut our throats, even if 
you behead us we are not going to allow this. We will fight with weapons and drive 
away whoever comes.  Without Niyamgiri we cannot think of life.  If we lose the 
mountain we will end up in great trouble.  We will lose our soul.  Niyamgiri is our 
soul. If Niyamgiri goes our soul will die’ (Guardian, 2009).  
 
 These two incompatible views reflect a profound incommensurability about the cultural, 
social, political and economic meaning of land and nature.  If market preferences are the only 
metric that determines the value of nature as demanded by the dominant global economic 
paradigm it invalidates other cultural and social values of nature held by Indigenous 
communities who do not have the economic or political power that market elites possess to 
challenge the invalidity of a universal metric  (McAfee, 1999).   Incommensurable views of land 
and nature are also reflected in the fundamental contradictions in the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People:  the only way for tribal communities to protect their rights in Orissa 
is for the state to cede sovereignty over the region or for tribal communities to establish secure 
property rights over land and resources.  And it is highly unlikely that at the level of the firm 
strategies of corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship and stakeholder engagement 
 can protect Indigenous rights unless there are external governance mechanisms with authority 
and power (Banerjee, 2010).  Framing the Niyamgiri mountains as their ‘soul’ is not a 
particularly efficient use of the ‘resource’ that permits extraction of surplus for the market.  Thus 
destruction of souls and bodies of communities fighting the endowment curse becomes a 
necessary condition for generating ‘wealth’.   As Karl Marx (1976: 344) said more than one 
hundred and fifty years ago, ‘between equal rights, force decides’.   
 An almost identical battle is being waged in another hemisphere and on another continent 
– this time deep in the Amazonian jungles of Peru and Ecuador.  The state’s decision to open up 
72% of communal rainforest lands and resources in the Peruvian Amazon to oil drilling, logging 
and mining without consultation with indigenous inhabitants have led to violent and bloody 
protests this year culminating in a massacre of unarmed Indigenous protestors by the Peruvian 
military.  Peru’s economic growth in recent years has had little effect on its Indigenous 
population (comprising nearly half the country’s population) where 40% of the Indigenous 
population live in dire poverty.  Justifying the attacks on the Indigenous inhabitants of the 
Amazon, the Peruvian President Alan Garcia had this to say:  
‘40,000 natives do not have the right to tell 28 million Peruvians not to come to their 
lands.  There is a conspiracy aimed at stopping us from using our natural resources 
for the good, growth and quality of life of our people.  You have to ask yourself: 
Who stands to benefit from Peru not being able to use its gas?  Who stands to benefit 
from Peru not finding any more oil?  We know who.  The important thing is to 
establish the ties in these international networks which have emerged to foment 
unrest’. (cited in www.democracy.now, 2009) 
 
 These new war zones across the globe illustrate the translocality of struggles over 
resources where the political society facing the brunt of development find themselves fighting 
against the forces of the market and the state.  It is precisely by investigating the ‘ties in these 
international networks which have emerged to foment unrest’ that a theory and politics of the 
 translocal can emerge that can provide alternatives to the single logic that pervades current 
notions of development and progress.  These conflicts represent a new economic and cultural 
‘imperialism without colonies’ where much of the imperialism is managed by market 
institutions.  Citizens can become citizens deserving state protection only if they produce 
exchange value, if not they will have to be relocated or killed in the name of progress and 
development.  Political sovereignty becomes subservient to corporate sovereignty and it is the 
economics of extraction, expulsion and exclusion, not political citizenship that will determine 
future war zones. 
 Translocal resistance is characterized by a plurality of organizational forms.  As place 
based movements influenced by transnational forces they can be conceptualized as ‘translocal 
assemblages’ emphasizing both spatiality and temporality, as well as capabilities of coherence 
and dispersion (McFarlane, 2009: 561).  They are more than just networks and connections 
between people, locations and organizations but represent local histories and memories and 
specific practices that arise from such configurations.  Translocal spaces are not mere outcomes 
of the structural forces of globalization and neither are they fully constituted by global – whether 
these are global forms of neoliberalism, nation states, citizenship, democracy or international 
regulation (Ong and Collier, 2005).  Transnational assemblages may take on new forms of 
organization (such as the World Social Forum) but translocal resistance is not contingent on the 
development of new organizational forms (although new forms of organization such as tribal 
councils have emerged as we will discuss later) but its forms are shifting and emergent, 
‘seamless and mobile, heterogeneous, unstable, partial and situated and the product of multiple 
determinations that are not reducible to a single logic’ (Ong and Collier, 2005: 12).  Indigenous 
resistance movements are examples of translocal assemblages where the aim is not just to 
 ‘improve living conditions’ in the current system but to change the logic of the political 
economic system (Mignolo, 2007).      
 The crucial difference in the logic of organization is perhaps best exemplified by the 
stated mission of the World Economic Forum (WEF).  Describing itself as an ‘independent, 
international, not-for-profit organization; the WEF’s vision is to be ‘the catalyst of choice for its 
communities when undertaking global initiatives to improve the state of the world’ (World 
Economic Forum, 2010).  In contrast, the World Social Forum (WSF) describes itself as  
‘not an organization, not a united front platform, but an open meeting place for 
reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free 
exchange of experiences and inter-linking for effective action, by groups and 
movements of civil society that are opposed to neoliberalism and to domination of 
the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are committed to building a 
society centered on the human person’ (World Social Forum, 2010). 
  
 The call for action is to imagine that ‘another world is possible’ under the assumption 
that the world cannot be improved by maintaining the logic of current economic, social and 
political arrangements (Mignolo, 2007).  The global assemblage that is the World Social Forum 
can enable local resistance movements to create translocal assemblages to challenge the uneven 
distribution of power that characterize contemporary practices of democracy and development.  
It is also important to appreciate the diversity of translocal resistance movements and the 
geopolitical contexts in which they emerge.  For example, Mignolo (2007) describes some 
Indigenous resistance movements like the Zapatistas as a struggle not just for cultural and 
economic rights but also for ‘epistemic rights’ starting with the decolonization of a knowledge 
system that is predicated on colonial difference and sustains the uneven distribution of power.  
Such a framing of resistance goes beyond the current liberal rhetoric of ‘social inclusion’ but 
advocates a plurality of cosmologies and epistemologies (Smith, 1999).  The discourse shifts 
 from inclusion to ‘interculturality’ which is ‘a shared project based on different origins that 
overcomes the imperial/nationalistic pride and interests’ (Mignolo, 2007: 143) or as the Zapatista 
manifesto puts it  ‘dwelling in a world where many worlds co-exist’ (Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation, 1995).  For instance, translocal resistance in Latin America has resulted in new 
organizational forms such as ‘Los Caracoloes’ which are Indigenous community assemblages 
consisting of social and political governance arrangements that reflect Indigenous epistemologies 
and ontologies and where economic and social relations are based on reciprocity and exchange 
rather than competition (Mignolo, 2007).  While these organizations exist within a nation state, 
identities and subjectivities of people that comprise them are predominantly ‘tribal’ with national 
subjectivity remaining a residual part.  
 
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
 In this paper I have described the organization and management of internal colonialism 
that enable practices of accumulation through extraction, expulsion and exclusion as well as the 
market-state nexus that provides the enforcement apparatus for accumulation to continue.  I show 
how conflicting sovereignties mark identities of Indigenous communities in the postcolonial era 
and how nation-state development regimes result in battles over land and resource use.  I 
describe some recent conflicts involving Indigenous communities, transnational corporations, the 
state and non-governmental organizations and outline a theory of translocal resistance that 
provides a deeper understanding of how local communities in different parts of the world engage 
with transnational actors to resist resource exploitation and displacement.   
 The paper extends our understanding of postcoloniality by theorizing internal colonialism 
as a condition that is experienced within the postcolonial, whereby the political economy of 
 resource extraction is based on colonial forms of development.  By describing different modes of 
accumulation the paper provides a critical perspective on corporate globalization.  In analyzing 
modes of resistance to the forces of accumulation by dispossession the paper proposes a theory 
of translocal resistance that emerges from particular configurations of power dynamics between 
market, state and civil society actors.  These theoretical insights can enable us to reconfigure 
organization studies by broadening the unit of analysis to focus not just on the individual 
organization, but on the organization of the political economy and on the organization of 
resistance to practices of exploitative resource extraction.  Conventional accounts of 
organization-stakeholder relationships do not capture the complex power dynamics between 
market, state and civil society actors occurring in different translocal spaces and understanding 
these configurations will enable us to imagine more participatory forms of decision-making, 
particularly from the standpoints of people that are adversely affected by resource extraction.   
 I point to four directions for future research to further develop the theoretical framework 
of translocality.  First, we need more rigorous empirical accounts and ethnographic analysis of 
ongoing conflicts over resources.  What are the similarities and difference in political and 
economic power configurations of the key actors and institutions that are involved in resource 
conflicts?  In what ways are local communities able to access transnational networks for their 
struggles?  Second, there is a need to develop a capability approach to translocal resistance.  
Given the vast power differentials between communities battling against state and market forces 
what capabilities do communities need to acquire in order to change the current relational system 
that leads to marginalization?  What forms of political identities can lead to some level of local 
political authority? How do translocal actors develop political capabilities and political 
authority?  Particular configurations of territory, authority and rights result in different and 
 multivalent capabilities – while learning to negotiate successfully with powerful market and state 
actors might be a positive capability for civil society actors, there are also negative capabilities 
that actors and institutions can develop, such as the capacity to destroy what should not be 
destroyed, for example, livelihoods, farming land, forests and the like (Sassen, 2006).   
 A third research direction is to understand the power dynamics between market, state and 
civil society actors in the context of livelihood struggles.  What discursive strategies do civil 
society actors use to contest the dominant economic discourse?  How do these strategies create 
new forms of authority and accountability?  How do authority and capability of non-market 
actors influence market and state responses? And finally there is a need for more research and a 
gendered analysis of translocal resistance movements.  Feminist scholars have pointed out the 
gendered dimensions of ecological knowledge and labor and described how the expansion of a 
colonial cash crop economy effectively marginalized women farmers because state and funding 
agencies typically targeted males as ‘heads of households’ for their ‘assistance’ programs 
(Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Jackson and Pearson, 1998).  Areas for future research on translocal 
movements include ecology, labor and gender as well as gendered institutional arrangements in 
regimes of property rights and natural resource access.  Exploring these questions can help us 
envision a more participatory democratic process rather than the coercive democracy imposed on 
Indigenous communities and offer ways of changing the normative framework of political 
decision-making.   
   To overcome a collective failure of the imagination we need to visit places of resistance, 
of protest, of livelihood struggles.  Instead of seeking more answers to the same questions we 
should be asking different questions.  A critical research agenda will not seek answers about 
 communities in different parts of the world protesting against corporations and governments, 
why are they willing to give up their lives for their struggle, what are the causes of dispossession 
and impoverishment of marginalized communities?  Perhaps a critical theory of translocal 
resistance can ‘bear the lightning of possible storms’ as the quote below by Foucault (1988: 326) 
suggests:  
‘Criticism would not try to judge, but would try to bring an oeuvre, a book, a 
sentence, an idea to life; it would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, 
and catch the sea-foam in the breeze and scatter it.  It would multiply, not judgments, 
but signs of existence.  Perhaps it would invent them sometimes—all the better…..all 
the better.  Criticism that hands down sentences sends me to sleep.  I’d like a 
criticism of scintillating leaps of the imagination.  It would not be sovereign or 
dressed in red.  It would bear the lightning of possible storms’. 
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